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February 17, 1999

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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

Ms. Magalie Roman Salas
Secretary
Federal Communications Commission
445 12th Street, S.W.
12th Street Lobby, TW-A325
Washington, D.C.


Re: Docket 96-115

Dear Ms. Salas:

Pursuant to 47 C.F.R. § 1.1206, please find enclosed an original and two copies each of the ex parte Comments of KMC Telecom, Inc., CTSI, Inc., and Focal Communications Corporation.

Please date-stamp an extra copy of each of the Comments and return them to our courier.

Very truly yours,



Russell M. Blau

cc: D. Anthony Mastando, CCB, Policy Division

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Before the
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Washington, DC 20554

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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

In the Matter of)	
)	
Implementation of the)	CC Docket No. 96-115
Telecommunications Act of 1996)	
)	
Telecommunications Carriers' Use)	
of Customer Proprietary Network)	
Information and Other)	
Customer Information)	

EX PARTE COMMENTS OF KMC TELECOM, INC.

KMC Telecom, Inc. ("KMC"), by its undersigned counsel, hereby submits these *ex parte* comments in the above-captioned proceeding. On June 25, 1998, KMC filed an Opposition to various Petitions for Reconsideration ("Petitions") of the Second Report and Order in this docket, insofar as certain Petitioners ask the Commission to eliminate or modify its rule prohibiting the use of Customer Proprietary Network Information ("CPNI") in "winback" campaigns. In this supplemental filing, KMC will address the claims in the United States Telephone Association ("USTA") and Bell Atlantic Petitions that the Commission did not provide adequate notice of or a proper rulemaking record to sustain the "anti-winback" rule promulgated in the Second Report and Order.¹

The first section of these comments addresses USTA and Bell Atlantic's contention that the CPNI Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ("NPRM") did not contain adequate notice to allow parties to comment on possible anti-competitive uses of CPNI. The second section of these comments addresses

¹ 47 C.F.R. § 64.2005(b)(3), as adopted in *Telecommunications Carriers' Use of Customer Proprietary Network Information and Other Consumer Information*, Second Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 F.C.C. Rcd. 8061, 8126, 8127 (1998) (hereinafter *Second Report and Order*).

the contention that the Commission did not compile a proper rulemaking record in the Second Report and Order to support the conclusion that the use of CPNI to try to “winback” former or soon-to-be former customers should be prohibited.

I. USTA and Bell Atlantic’s Claim That the Anti-Winback Rule Was Improperly Noticed Is Without Merit

Under the Administrative Procedure Act, before promulgating a rule, a federal agency must provide “either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved.”² This “description of the subjects and issues involved” has generally been interpreted by the courts as requiring enough notice to any affected parties to allow those parties to comment and develop evidence and other support for their positions.³ In the instant case, the Commission provided a cogent summary of the issues that were involved in the CPNI proceeding in the NPRM, and requested comments on possible new rules concerning the question of “whether AT&T, the BOCs, and GTE continue to possess a competitive advantage with respect to access to and use of customer CPNI, as well as whether any other entities, such as independent LECs, now possess similar advantages.”⁴

The references in the NPRM to potential “competitive advantages” to incumbent carriers based on access to CPNI put these carriers on notice that the Commission was considering restrictions on how they might use this information in the competitive arena. Given the Commission’s emphasis on competition, it should have been clear to any reasonable person that the use of CPNI in marketing campaigns was within the scope of the proposed rules. The final rules approved by the Commission

² 5 U.S.C. §553(b)(3) (1994).

³ *See Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA*, 705 F.2d 506, 547 (D.C. Cir. 1983).

⁴ *See Telecommunications Carriers’ Use of Customer Proprietary Network Information and other Customer Information*, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 F.C.C.Rcd. 12513, 12530 (1996).

represent the logical outgrowth of this discussion in the NPRM. In reviewing the adequacy of notice given by an agency in formulating a legislative rule, courts often look at whether the final rule promulgated represents a “logical outgrowth” of the proposals noticed in the NPRM.⁵ In this case, the use of CPNI in “winback” campaigns is simply one context in which incumbents may derive a competitive advantage from their access to customer data, and the adoption of regulations on this subject is a logical outgrowth of the Commission’s proposal to act in this area.

The fact that the NPRM did not specify verbatim the text of a proposed rule, or the exact specifics of a proposal is irrelevant. Under section 553(b)(3) of the APA and relevant case law, all that is required of an agency is that affected parties be notified of the subjects and issues of a contemplated rule, and be afforded an opportunity to comment on those issues.⁶ The NPRM certainly gave interested persons an opportunity to comment on any use of CPNI to gain a competitive advantage; the Commission was not required to itemize each and every potential use of information that it was thinking about mentioning in its regulations. Acceptance of USTA and Bell Atlantic’s contentions that the rulemaking process consists of a system where proposed rules must be specified in excruciating detail, and then be adopted only if parties comment on the minute details of each proposal, is unwarranted by the APA, and would lead to unnecessary ossification of the Commission’s administrative process.

⁵ *Public Service Commission of the District of Columbia v. FCC*, 906 F.2d 713, 717 (D.C. Cir. 1990).

⁶ *See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC*, 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978) (stating that “section [553] of the [APA] established the maximum procedural requirements which Congress was willing to have the courts impose upon agencies in conducting rulemaking procedures.”).

II. Claims That the Rulemaking Record Provides Insufficient Support for the “Anti-Winback” Rule Are Similarly Without Merit

The second prong of USTA and Bell Atlantic’s APA attack on the “anti-winback” rule appears to revolve around the vague contention that the final rule is not supported by the record in the Second Report and Order. This analysis should be rejected for a number of reasons. First, the ‘anti-winback’ rule plainly reflects the legislative intent of section 222(d)(1), which states that carriers may use customer CPNI, in certain situations as permitted by section 222(c)(1), to “initiate, render, bill, and collect for telecommunications services.”⁷ In the case of “winback” campaigns directed at soon-to-be former customers or customers that have expressed a definite intention to leave a provider, the carrier is not attempting to initiate service with that customer, but instead is trying to convince the customer not to terminate their service. In this case, the “anti-winback” rule flows almost directly from Congressional pronouncement, and not from any “reasonableness” determination by the Commission. The rulemaking record is not required to be as extensive for rules that implement Congressional directives, as opposed to rules that interpret broad policy objectives.

Second, with regard to the rulemaking record itself, the allegations of USTA and Bell Atlantic contain many fallacies. Bell Atlantic, in its Petition claims that the “anti-winback” rule was promulgated “with no record support.”⁸ USTA similarly contends that the rule was promulgated “without the benefit of a record on which to predicate reasoned decision-making.”⁹ Both contentions are untrue and without merit. In the Second Report and Order, the Commission clearly showed that

⁷ 47 U.S.C. § 222(d)(1) (1994).

⁸ Bell Atlantic Petition for Reconsideration at 16.

⁹ USTA Petition for Reconsideration at 6.

it considered the record on the winback issue by concluding that “[w]e also do not believe, contrary to the position of AT&T, that section 222(d)(1) permits the former (or soon-to-be former) carrier to use the CPNI of its former customer . . . for customer retention purposes.”¹⁰ In addition, the Commission stated that “use of CPNI in this context is not statutorily permitted under section 222(d)(1), insofar as such use would be undertaken to market a service to which a customer previously subscribed, rather than to ‘initiate’ a service. . . .” This explanation shows that the Commission considered the alternative position of allowing the use of CPNI for “winback” campaigns, and rejected this option based on its reading of the statute and competitive concerns. This explanation of the Commission’s decisional process, while terse, is all that is required under the APA because it clearly shows that the Commission considered the probable anti-competitive effects of allowing the use of CPNI in “winback” campaigns, considered alternative comments, and promulgated a rule that follows Congressional directives.¹¹ Therefore, the Commission should also reject USTA and Bell Atlantic’s arguments regarding the sufficiency of the rulemaking record.

¹⁰ *Second Report and Order*, 13 F.C.C. Rcd. at 8126.

¹¹ *See Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Assn. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.*, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1982). In that case, the Court stated the general guidelines for what constitutes an “arbitrary and capricious” record:


Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.

Id.

III. Conclusion

The Commission's decision to adopt the "anti-winback" rule represents rational decision-making that comports with section 553 of the APA and interpretive case law. The Commission considered the other possible option, responded to comments, and issued a rule that follows Congressional directives and is plainly reasonable in light of the evidence. As such, the Commission should reject USTA and Bell Atlantic's Petitions for Reconsideration on the "anti-winback" rule.

Respectfully submitted,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Russell M. Blau", written in black ink.

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